

***United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit***



APPENDIX

76-1487

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

DOCKET NO. 76 - 1486

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,


- against -

WALLACE JARVIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPENDIX OF APPELLANT

Guy L. Heinemann
Attorney for
Defendant-Appellant
410 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
(212) 753-1400



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Disp. Assistance

DOE, - JOHN

WALLACE JARVIS

76

253

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

OFFENSES CHARGED

18-2113(a)(d) & 2

Bank robbery and use of a
dangerous weapon18:2113(a)
18:2113(c)Bank Robbery
Bank Robbery and use of a dangerous
weaponU.S. MAG.
CASE NO.

AMT

Dated

So

\$ 50,000

Date

But Not Made

Status Changed

(See Booklet)

100% Deposit

Surety Bond

Collateral

3rd

Pty Cust

Other

II. KEY DATES & INTERVALS

ARREST or

U.S. Custody Begins

Summons Served

First Appearance

High Risk Case

Indict. Waived

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INDICTMENT

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WALLACE JARVIS - 2

76 253 2
Yr. Docket No. Def.

DATE	PROCEEDINGS (continued)	V. EXCLUDABLE DELAY			
		(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
7/13/76	Before PRATT, J. - Deft & Counsel present. Hearing ordered & begun. Hearing to continue on 7.14.76 at 10:00 a.m.				
7/13/76	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum issued & filed.				
7-14-76	Before PRATT, J - case called - deft & counsel Guy Heinemann present - Wade -Simmons hearing contd and concluded - Miranda hearing held and concluded - trial ordered and BEGUN- Jurors selected and sworn - trial contd to July 15, 1976 at 10:30 am.				
7/15/76	Before PRATT, J. - Deft & Counsel present. Trial resumed- Defts motion to suppress, etc. Motions denied. Trial to continue on 7/16/76 at 10:00 a.m.				
7-16-76	Before PRATT, J - case called - deft & counsel present - trial resumed - trial contd to 7-19-76.				
7-20-76	Before PRATT, J - case called - deft & counsel present - trial resumed - deft rests - Govt rests - deft sums up - Govt rebuttal sums up - Judge charges Jury at 2:00 PM - alt. discharged - Jury returns from its deliberations and renders a verdict of guilty as to counts 1 and 2 - bail contd - post trial motions to be heard on day of sentence - sentence adjd without date - Order of sustenance filed and signed.				
7/22/76	76 M 1057 filed in Criminal file.				
8-19-76	Defts Memorandum of Law filed				
9/24/76	Before PRATT, J.- Case called. Deft & Counsel present. Deft renews his motion to set aside verdict. Motion denied. Deft sentenced to imprisonment for a total period of 5 years, on counts 1 and 2 of the indictment. The Court appoints Guy Heinemann to represent the deft on appeal and the court orders that the deft can appeal in forma pauperis. Bail contd. pending appeal. Mr. Jarvis business set as additional bail.				
9/24/76	Judgment & commitment filed. Certified copies to Marshals.				
9/28/76	Voucher for compensation for expert services filed.				
10-6-76	Notice of appeal filed (no fee)				
10-4-76	Docket entries and duplicate of notice mailed to the court of appeals				
10-12-76	Stenographers transcript filed dated July 16, 1976.				
10-21-76	Stenographers transcript filed dated May 19, 1976.				
10-26-76	Voucher for expert services filed				
10-26-76	Two transcripts filed (one dated July 14 and July 15, 1976) and one dated July 19 and July 20, 1976.				
11-1-76	Stenographer's Transcript dated May 21, 1976 - Filed.				
11-1-76	Stenographers transcript dated May 4, 1976 filed				
11-3-76	Order received that the record be docketed on or before 12-1-76. Filed.				

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V. EXCLUDABLE DELAY			
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
nd			
3,			

RP:JMH:ch
. 4761,554

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

- - - - - X

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- against -

WALLACE JARVIS,

Defendant.

- - - - - X

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

COUNT ONE

On or about the 2nd day of February, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant WALLACE JARVIS knowingly and wilfully, by force, violence, and intimidation, did take from the person and presence of employees of the European-American Bank, 31-21 Thompson Avenue, Long Island City, Queens, New York, approximately Four Thousand Seven Hundred Nineteen Dollars (\$4,719.00) in United States currency in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the said bank, the deposits of which bank were then and there insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2113(a) and 2).

Winsten
SUPERSEDING
INDICTMENT

76 CR 253(S-1)
(T. 18, U.S.C. §2113(a)
& (d) and §2)

76 CR 253(S)

COUNT TWO

On or about the 2nd day of February 1976, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant WALLACE JARVIS did knowingly and wilfully, by force, violence, and intimidation, take from the person and presence of employees of the European-American Bank, 31-21 Thompson Avenue, Long Island City, Queens, New York, approximately Four Thousand Seven Hundred Nineteen Dollars (\$4,719.00) in United States currency in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the said bank, the deposits of which bank were then and there insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and in commission of this act and offense the defendant WALLACE JARVIS did assault and place in jeopardy the lives of the said bank employees, as well as the lives of other persons present, by the use of a dangerous weapon. (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2113(d) and 2).

A TRUE BILL.

FOREMAN.

DAVID G. TRAGER
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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JULY 15, 1976

THE COURT: Gentlemen, yesterday we concluded about a day and a half of hearings on the defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence which may be offered in this case.

The motions seem to break into three parts. First, requested suppression on the grounds that the arrest itself was illegal. That claim is based upon the fact we are dealing here with a John Doe warrant which doesn't on its face describe the identity of John Doe. The defendant argues we may not use extrinsic evidence for purposes of supplementing the warrant itself, that the warrant therefore violates the appropriate rule of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, is invalid and that everything that flows from the warrant must be suppressed. He includes in what should be suppressed, mug shot which was taken, fingerprints which were taken, the defendant's presence at the lineup and any other statements made by the defendant.

The motion based upon illegality of arrest is denied. I cannot accept the argument that extrinsic evidence may not be used in

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1 conjunction with the warrant. Logic compels the
2 conclusion that no piece of paper may identify
3 either a person or place. Extrinsic evidence is
4 always necessary. If you pass the purely formal
5 level of analysis to get the underlying purpose
6 of a warrant, the Fourth Amendments prohibition
7 against unreasonable searches and seizures, you
8 find that in the circumstances here we have a
9 warrant which within the operation of the
10 Government, that is the U. S. Attorney's office,
11 the F.B.I., the Grand Jury, the warrant is
12 clearly and historically here tied to the
13 indictment itself. It charges a specific crime.
14 It is a crime committed by two individuals, one of
15 whom was identified as John Doe rather than as
16 Wallace Jarvis for the reason the name of the
17 individual was not known. In order to take the
18 charged defendant into custody it was necessary,
19 as it always is necessary, to relate the words of
20 the warrant to the body which is to be seized.
21 That, as I said, requires extrinsic evidence.
22 There's no question here but that the extrinsic
23 evidence which was available was sufficient, proper,
24 clear identification of the defendant as the person
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sought in the warrant. Therefore, the face of the warrant itself, I find it was a valid warrant for purposes of this arrest under these circumstances.

The argument is made -- technically they do not have to reach it -- but the argument has been made and for the record so that it will be clear in the event of any appeal which might be taken, that if the warrant is invalid then the arrest here must be held to be illegal because the Constitutional requirement for arrest in a private home must override the authority given to the F.B.I. under 18 U. S. Code 3052, to arrest based on probable cause. Under the circumstances here, the defendant -- we will forget what the defendant might concede. He needs to concede nothing. But the probable cause is clear. The only question remaining being the one left open in United States against Watson where the Supreme Court indicated they were not in that case deciding whether or not a search of a private home under the statutory authority granted would have to be invalidated by the Constitutional provision. Were I to be called upon to decide that question, I would decide the question that the statutory

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2 authority is sufficient to authorize this arrest
3 based on the circumstances which face the F.B.I.
4 It would be authorized under the U. S. Code. So
5 much for the first aspect of the suppression.

6 As to the second, the defendant seeks to
7 suppress three statements which he is claimed to
8 have made. One that he knew Blanchurd; second,
9 that he didn't know Bowman and third the front door
10 is to the left. Near the end of the motion with
11 respect to the third statement as to the front door
12 being to the left in one of the photographs was
13 withdrawn. With respect to the other two
14 statements, I note in passing, there is other
15 evidence concerning his knowledge of Blanchurd and
16 that the statement that he does not know Bowman
17 is a false one by the defendant's own testimony.
18 Neither of those circumstances weighs in my
19 decision to deny this motion. I have heard the
20 testimony, particularly that of Agent Wichner and
21 of the defendant and I find credible the testimony
22 that the defendant was read his rights three times
23 in the course of the arrest of the booking process
24 which extended over a period of approximately one
25 hour. I find there is no undue delay in the

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processing of the defendant up to the time he
appeared before the magistrate. There is no
evidence of coercion, no threats of bodily harm.
There's not even a claim of a forced confession or
overbearing of his will. On the contrary, the
defendant's own testimony shows he demonstrated
a remarkable composure, self-control and resistance
to the Government's questioning both before and
after the alleged statements concerning Blanchard
and Mr. Bowman.

The motion under the Miranda portion of
the hearing is also denied.

As to the third portion, the motion to
suppress the identification testimony of two
eyewitnesses, Di Giacomo and Morales, both of these
witnesses identified the defendant at the lineup.
We have been told both of them will testify at the
trial. Di Giacomo also identified the defendant
in a photo spread. Morales did not, although
given an opportunity to do so she was able to pick
out the defendant from the photo spread. The
motion in this respect is denied in all respects.
The case law dictates each fact situation must be
viewed by itself. The basic test is whether the

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2 procedures used in the precourtroom identification
3 procedures were impermissibly suggestive. I find
4 under the circumstances here that the procedures
5 were not impermissibly suggestive. Weighing the
6 various factors involved, it appears both
7 witnesses had a good opportunity to observe the
8 defendant at the bank. They both were in a
9 position to have paid close attention to him. They
10 dealt with him while he was there. Neither one
11 panicked. They helped him to get the money he was
12 demanding.

13 As to the prior descriptions of the
14 witness -- I'm sorry. As to the prior
15 descriptions given by the witnesses of the
16 defendant on the record thus far before me they are
17 not too clear in either case. I do not find,
18 however, as the first point was not extensively
19 developed in the testimony, but particularly with
20 the case of Morales who seemed somewhat uncertain
21 as to what description she had given of the
22 robber behind the counter shortly after the
23 event, when the time came when she saw him in
24 person she seemed certain of her identification.
25 The argument of impermissibly suggestive techniques

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2 being used by the Government falls particularly
3 with respect to Miss Morales since she looked at a
4 photo spread involving Mr. Bowman and said he most
5 likely resembled the defendant of the five or six
6 photographs which were in front of her.

7 While she was not able to pick out the
8 defendant from the photo spread in April which was
9 given to him the 22nd, I believe it was, she said
10 in substance something clicked when she saw him in
11 person in the same lineup when Mr. Bowman was
12 there. She clearly distinguished between Mr. Bowman
13 and Mr. Jarvis. Had there been suggestive
14 techniques used, one would expect her to have found
15 Mr. Bowman, to pick him out of the lineup rather
16 than Mr. Jarvis. Both of the witnesses were
17 certain of the identifications which they made on
18 the first occasion when they made them.

19 One of the witnesses repeated more than
20 once, I forget whether it was Di Giacomo or
21 Morales, used the term positive. I believe it was
22 Mr. Di Giacomo.

23 Finally, the time lapse between the event
24 and the time of the out-of-court identifications,
25 a matter of approximately eleven weeks, I find that

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2 is not an inordinate delay under the circumstances
3 here and does not in my view render the
4 identification made unreliable or under the
5 circumstances of the manner in which the lineup
6 and the photo spreads were handled does it
7 contribute toward making them impermissibly
8 suggestive. Both witnesses testified they had
9 been given no suggestions as to who the right man
10 was. No gestures were made. No instructions
11 were given. I find that testimony to be credible.

12 The defendant has argued the statements
13 or indications of agreement by Mr. Wichner after
14 the correct identifications were made must
15 necessarily render the entire proceedings invalid
16 because those statements alone constitute
17 impermissibly suggestive material. I do not agree
18 under the circumstances as they were described on
19 the witness stand. I do not believe and I find it
20 is not the case that the identifications made by
21 either witness was influenced by whatever
22 indications Mr. Wichner may have given after the
23 identifications were made; that they agreed what I
24 believe he described as his professional opinion
25 who the robber behind the counter was. Neither of

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2 the two individuals in question here, Di Giacomo
3 or Morales, appeared to be suggestible-type people.

4 Di Giacomo was particularly positive in
5 his identification, was clear in his testimony that
6 when he picked the defendant out of the photo
7 spread on April 22nd, he did it based upon his
8 memory of what he saw in the bank February 2nd and
9 he was equally positive when he picked the
10 defendant out of the lineup it was also based on
11 his direct memory of the February 2nd events.
12 I find his testimony to be credible on that point.

13 Miss Morales, far from being suggestible,
14 was quite an independent person. She thought
15 Bowman most resembled the defendant. She was not
16 told immediately thereafter that the Government
17 disagreed with her, but immediately when she saw
18 the defendant in the same lineup with Bowman she
19 quickly picked out the defendant. She had no
20 hesitation or doubt about it.

21 In short, I find there is nothing in the
22 circumstances which were developed before me to
23 show improper suggestion to either of the witnesses
24 or any indication of influence on either witnesses'
25 identification as a result of the procedures used.

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2 In short, all three motions are denied. The motion
3 made by the defendant to strike as irrelevant the
4 testimony of the defendant that he had been to the
5 bank before, that motion is granted. I have placed
6 no reliance on that testimony in arriving at the
7 decision on the following three motions. Those are
8 my rulings, gentlemen. Are we ready to proceed
9 with opening statements.

10 MR. MARKS: I am ready, your Honor. There
11 are two points I'd like to make. First, your Honor
12 referred to an arraignment before the magistrate.
13 I think that was based on a statement I made
14 yesterday which was incorrect. The magistrate
15 didn't arraign the defendant. He was arraigned
16 before Judge Weinstein.

17 THE COURT: Thank you for correcting that.

18 MR. MARKS: I've had Karen Klegg call
19 Washington and she's talked to somebody at the
20 Treasury Department who said he's been able to find
21 the check and was about to put it in the mail.
22 I've had my secretary call to ask them to send a
23 photocopy so Mr. Heinemann can have the check.

24 THE COURT: That's rather remarkable
25 service.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Index No. 76-1487

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

against

Plaintiff—
Appellee

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
BY MAIL

WALLACE JARVIS,

—Defendant—
Appellant.

STATE OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF NEW YORK

ss.:

The undersigned being duly sworn, deposes and says:

*Deponent is not a party to the action, is over 18 years of age and resides at 235 East 50th Street,
New York, New York 10022*

That on January 20,
to Brief for Appellant

19 77 deponent served the annexed Appendix

on David D. Trager, Esq.
~~attorney for~~ United States Attorney for Appellee, United States of America
in this action at 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York 11201
the address designated by said attorney(s) for that purpose by depositing a true copy of same enclosed
in a postpaid properly addressed wrapper, in—a post office—official depository under the exclusive care
and custody of the United States Postal Service within the State of New York.

Sworn to before me January 20, 1977

Randy N. Eisenpress

RANDY N. EISENPRESS
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 31-4601692
Qualified in New York County
Term Expires March 30, 1979

Judy Weiss
The name signed must be printed beneath
JUDY WEISS

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING

STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF KINGS

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

} ss

DOLORES M. BYRD

being duly sworn,

deposes and says that he is employed in the office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York.

That on the 9th day of August 1977 he served a copy of the within
PETITION FOR REHEARING

by placing the same in a properly postpaid franked envelope addressed to:
GUY L. HEINEMANN, ESQ.

410 PARK AVENUE

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022

and deponer further says that he sealed the said envelope and placed the same in the mail chute
drop for mailing in the United States Court House, ^{225 Cadman Plaza East} ~~Washington Street~~, Borough of Brooklyn, County
of Kings, City of New York.

Sworn to before me this

9th day of August 1977

Carolyn N. Johnson

NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF NEW YORK
No. 41-461802

Qualified in Queens County
Term Expires March 30, 1979